Abstract. In theory, a neural network can be trained to act as an artificial specification for a program by showing it samples of the programs executions. In practice, the training turns out to be very hard. Programs often operate on discrete domains for which patterns are difficult to discern. Earlier experiments reported too much false positives. This paper revisits an experiment by Vanmali et al. by investigating several aspects that were uninvestigated in the original work: the impact of using different learning modes, aggressiveness levels, and abstraction functions. The results are quite promising.
Introduction
Nowadays, many systems make use of external services or components to do some of their tasks, allowing services to be shared, hence reducing cost. However, we also need to take into account that third parties services may be updated on the fly as our system is running in production. If such an update introduces an error, this may affect the correctness of our system as well. One way to guard against this is by doing run time verification [2] : at the runtime the outputs of these services are checked against their formal specifications. Unfortunately, in practice it is hard to persuade developers to write formal specifications.
A more pragmatic idea is to use 'artificial specifications' generated by a computer. Another use case is automated testing. Tools like QuickCheck, Evosuite, and T3 [3, 6, 13] are able to generate test inputs, but if no specification is given, only common correctness conditions such as absence of crashes can be checked. Using artificial specifications would extend their range.
Although we cannot expect a computer to be able to on its own specify the intent of a program, it can still try to guess this intent. One way to do this is by observing some training executions to predict general properties of the program, e.g. in the form of 'invariants' (state properties) [5] , finite state machine [12] , or algebraic properties [4] . These approaches cannot however capture the full functionality of a program, e.g. [5] can only infer predefined families of predicates, many are simple predicates such as such as o =null and x+y≥0. With respect to these approaches, neural networks offer an interesting alternative, since they can be trained to simulate a function [9] .
The trade off of using artificial specifications is the additional overhead in debugging. When a production-time execution violates such a specification, the failure may be either caused by an error triggered by the execution, or by an error in the training executions that were reflected in the predictions, or due to inaccuracy of the predictions. The first two cases expose errors (though the second case would take more effort to debug). However, the failure in the last case is a false alarm (false positive). Since we do not know upfront if a violation is a real error or a false positive, we will need to investigate it (debugging), which is quite labour intensive. If it turns out to be a false positive, the effort is wasted. Despite the potential, studies on the use of neural networks as artificial specifications are few: [16, 1, 11, 10] . They either reported unacceptably high rate of false positives, or do not address the issue.
In this paper we revisit an experiment by Vanmali et al. [16] that revealed ≈ 16% rate of false positives -a rate of above 5% is likely to render any approach unusable in practice. The challenge lies in the discrete nature of the program used as the experiment subject, making it very hard to train a neural network. This paper explores several aspects that were left uninvestigated in the original work, namely the influence of different learning modes, aggresiveness levels, and abstraction. The results are quite promising.
Neural Network as an Artificial Specification
Consider a program P that behave as a function I→O. An artificial specification φ is a predicate I×O→bool; φ(x, P (x))=T means that P 's output is judged as correct, and else incorrect. With respect to the intended specification G, φ's judgment is a true positive is when both φ and G judge a T, a true negative is when they agree on the judgement F, a false positive is when φ judges F and G judges T, and a false negative is when φ judges T and G judges F.
An neural network (NN) is a network of 'neurons' [9] that behaves as a function R M →R N . We will restrict ourselves to feed forward NNs (FNNs) where the neurons are organized in linearly ordered layers [9] ; an example is below:
The first layer is called the input layer, consisting of M neurons connected to the inputs. The last layer is the output layer, consisting of N neurons that produce the outputs. The layers in between are called hidden layers. An input neuron simply passes on its input, else it has k inputs and an additional input called 'bias' whose value is always 1 [9] . Each input connector has a weight w i . The neuron's output is the weighted sum of its inputs, followed by applying a socalled activation function: out = f (Σ 0≤i≤k w i .x i ). A commonly used f is the logistic function, which we also use in our experiments.
Any continuous numeric function R M →R N , restricted within any closed subset of R M , can be simulated with arbitrary accuracy by an FNN [7] , which implies that an FNN can indeed act as an artificial specification for P , if P is injectable into such a numeric function. That is, there exists a continuous numeric function F :R M →R N and injections π I :I→R N and π O :O→R N such that F encodes P : for all x∈I, P (x)=π
). However, finding a right FNN is hard. A common 1 a p p r o v e ( C i t i z e n s h i p , S t a t e , R e g i o n , Sex , Age , M a r i t a l , D e p e n d e n t s , Income ) { technique to find one is by training an FNN using a set of sample inputs and outputs, e.g. using the back propagation [9] algorithm. It might be easier to train the NN to simulate α • P instead, where α is some chosen abstraction on P 's output values. The trade off is that we get a weaker specification.
Since an NN does not literally produce a bool, we couple its output vector z =NN(π I (x)) to a so-called comparator C : R N →R N →bool to calculate the judgement by comparingz with the observed outputz=π O (α(P (x))). Basically, if their values are 'far' from each other, then the judgement is F, and else T. By adjusting what 'far' means we can tune the specification's aggressiveness without having to tamper with the NN's internals. In our experiments (below), the identity function id=(λx. x) will be used as the injector π I and π O . Because id simply passes on its input, it will be omitted from the formulas. Figure 1 shows a credit approval program from the financial domain that was used as the experiment subject by Vanmali et al [16] . The program takes 8 input parameters describing a customer. The output is a pair (b, y) where b is a boolean indicating whether the credit request is approved, and if so y specifies the maximum allowed credit. We will ignore b since [16] already shows that an FNN can accurately predict its value. Despite its size, the subject is quite challenging for an NN to simulate because it operates on a discrete domain (the numeric values are all integers). The whole input domain has 224000 possible values. We will use an FNN with 8 inputs (representing approve's inputs) and a hidden layer with 24 neurons (adding more layers and neurons does not really improve the FNN's accuracy).
Experiments
Five variations of the FNN will be used, as listed below, along with the used comparator C. C is parameterized with aggressiveness level A (integer 0 (least aggressive) ... 5) that determines C's policy to deal with non clear-cut cases.
1. The FNN direct has one output, which is trained to simulate y. Its comparator C A uses Euclidian distance, with sensitivity linearly scaled by A: The thresholds th low and th high are set to 0.2/0.8. 3. The FNN unimin N is a less presumptuous variant of uni, with th low /th high set to 0.1/0.9. This will cause more cases to be regarded as non-clear-cut. 4. The FNN lower N is like uni N , but trained to simulate α N • low • approve.
low is used to 'stretch' α N to divide y into finer intervals in the lower region of y's range, e.g. if we believe the region to be more error prone, and growing coarser towards the other end. We use the log function to do this: K * log(1+ y/a) with K=8000 and a=100 controlling the steepness. 5. The FNN center N is like uni N , but trained to simulate α N • ctr • approve.
ctr is used to 'stretch' α N to divide y into finer intervals in the center region of y's range. We use logistic function ctr(y)=M/(1 + e −a(y−0.5M ) ) where M =18000 (y's maximum) and a=0.0006 determines the function's steepness.
Training. We randomly generate 500 distinct inputs (from the space of 224000 values) and collect the corresponding approve's outputs. This set of 500 pairs (input,output) forms the training data. For every type of FNN above and every aggressiveness level an FNN is trained. N controls the granularity of the used abstraction, so we also try various N (10..60). For each FNN, the connections' weight is randomly initialized in [−0.5..0.5]. The training is done in a series of epochs using the back propagation algorithm [9] . We tried both the incremental learning mode [9, 8] , where the FNN's error is propagated back after each training input, and batch learning modes, where only the average error is propagated back, after the whole batch of training inputs (500 of them). Incremental learning is thus more sensitive to the influence of individual inputs.
Evaluation. To evaluate the FNNs' ability to detect errors, we run them on 21 erroneous variations (mutants) of the subject as in [16] -they are listed in the Appendix. For each mutant, 500 distinct random inputs are generated, whose outputs are 'error exposing' (distinguishable from the corresponding outputs of the correct subject). As an artificial specification, an FNN should ideally reject all these error exposing outputs. Each rejection is a true positive. We also generate 500 distinct random inputs and feed it to the (unmutated) subject. The FNN should accepts the corresponding outputs -each rejection is a false positive. Figure 2 shows some of the results. Except for direct, the training was done in 1500 epochs with learning rate 0.5. We can see that using abstraction improves the FNN's performance: compare direct with uni 30 . The latter obtains a true positive rate 68% on aggressiveness 2, implying that out of two erroneous executions, uni 30 is likely to detect at least one, while when the aggressiveness level is set low, its rate of false positives is only around 2%. Abstraction also makes training easier: after 1500 epochs uni 30 produces a mean square error (MSE) of ≈ 0.0001, whereas the shown results for direct is obtained after 10000 epochs (incrementally) with 0.1 learning rate, yielding an MSE ≈ 0.0004.
The experiment in [16] uses unimin 10 . We believe [16] used batch learning because the reported MSE after 1500 epochs matches, namely ≈ 0.05. However, as can be seen in Figure 2 , this leads to poor performance (batched unimin 10 ). Incremental learning yields a much more accurate FNN (≈ 0.0001 MSE), hence also better performance (unimin 10 ). The performance of the FNN in [16] under our setup is indicated by the vanmali-markers in Figure 2 .
The effect of using different abstractions and abstraction granularity (the N parameter) is shown in Figure 3 . Based on the results in Figure 2 , we now use the lowest aggressiveness level (0). The graph of uni shows that increasing N can greatly improve the FNN's ability to detect error, while keeping the false positive rate below 5%. We also see α N and α N • low perform significantly better than α N • ctr, implying that the choice of the abstraction function matters. Compared to α N , α N • low and α N • ctr introduce non-linear granularity. The results suggest that introducing more granularity in the region (of P 's output) which are more error prone pays off. 
Conclusion
The experiment showed that, contrary to earlier attempts, it is possible to train Neural Networks, given an appropriate abstraction, to become an artificial specification for a non-trivial program with acceptable precision. As future work, more case studies are needed to see how this generalizes. Let's first consider the true positives (top graph). We see here that on mutants M16, M17, and M20 uni actually performs very poorly. See the top graph in Figure 4 -uni's results on these three cases are annotated in the graph.
In contrast, the hardest mutants for lower are M13 and M14, but even on these mutants lower has a true positive rate of >10%. Whether this 10% is good enough depends on the situation. We have defined the rate of true positives as the percentage of wrong executions that the FNN judges as wrong as well. In particular, note that the metric is not defined as the percentage of mutations that can be discovered. If we would define it like this, lower would have 100% rate of true positives because with enough test cases eventually it will be able to detect all mutants. So, 10% individual rate of true positives for e.g. M14 means thus that if we manage to trigger at least 10 distinct executions that expose the mutation, statistically the FNN has a good chance to detect at least one of them, and thus identifying the mutation. While this sounds very encouraging, note that the actual probability for detecting the error also depends on the probability of producing executions that expose it. In the experiments, the probability of the latter is simply 1: we knew upfront that there is a mutation, so generating the set of error exposing executions for each mutant was not problematic. In a real regression testing setup, it is not possible to steer the testing process towards exposing a particular error; we do not even know upfront if the new version of the program would contain any regression error at all. There are indeed tools to automatically generate test inputs capable of generating a large number of test cases [3, 14] . However, it is hard to generate test cases that are evenly distributed over all control paths in the target program. Some paths may even be left uncovered because they are too difficult to cover, even by tools that employ more sophisticated techniques like an evolutionary algorithm [6] or symbolic calculation [15] .
The bottom graph in Figure 4 shows the individual false positive rate of uni and lower. Each bar in this graph also has its own error bar to indicate the standard deviation σ of the value the bar represents (the error bar is capped above at 100 and below at 0, since true/false positive rates can only range between [0..100]). For each mutant M , and each experiment (e.g. lower), the error E M of the false positive rate of the experiment is calculated by randomly dividing the set of 500 executions used in the experiment, into 5 bags of 100 elements and then we calculate the false positive rate of the experiment with respect to each bag. E M is defined as the standard deviation of these values. The error bars indicate that sometimes the false positive rate can peak above 5%, though in average both configurations, uni and lower, produce rates that are below 5%, for every individual mutant.
